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Abstract 
 
Contrary to the common notion that Muslims are fundamentalist, anti-modern, and against 
Western norms (hence their opposition to secularism), this paper argues that Muslims are not 
homogeneous. Therefore, their approach to secularism is not a matter of their assumed fixed 
religiosity. One recognises that, after seeing the Ahmadiyya Muslim community endorsing secular 
values in Canada, the assumption that Muslims coming to the West are anti-secular is misleading. 
The community’s persecution and loss of religious identity in Pakistan have moderated their 
approach toward secularism. To prove the hypothesis, Ahmadiyya teachings, addresses by living 
caliphs, and public statements from Ahmadiyya leaders are used to highlight changes in the 
community’s approaches toward secularism. The argument is based on the rise of Islamic 
nationalism in Pakistan, which excluded Ahmadis from the fold of Islam and placed them on the 
path of persecution. Brief comparative case studies of Alevis and Ismailis are included to 
strengthen the findings of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Muslims, Ahmadiyya, Ahmadis, homogeneous, heterogeneous, persecution, 
secularism, Pakistan, Canada,  
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1. Introduction 
 
Canada feels proud of having the highest number of foreign-born citizens than in any other Group 
of Eight (G8) countries. By opening doors to immigration and any persecuted communities across 
the world, Canada has created a society of mixed religions. It respects the religious and cultural 
values of diverse segments of its society, having the separation of state and religion at the core of 
its policy. Among multiple religions, Islam remains part of controversial debates about the extent 
to which Muslims endorse secular values. After 9/11, a community-based study of Canadian 
Muslim women reported anger and fear of a backlash, personal safety, and the future of their 
children in Canada. The participants raised concerns about their sense of belonging in Canada 
based on their religion. The Hérouxville Code of Conduct and statements of different Canadians 
before Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences 
(Bouchard-Taylor Commission) in 2007 reflected the perception of the majority Canadians, who 
see Muslims as a challenge to secularism and gender equality, which are considered an integral 
part of “Quebec’s national identity” (Dawson and Bramadat 2014, 147-48). Liberal MP Iqra 
Khalid, an immigrant from Pakistan, introduced Motion 103 in 2016 for the condemnation of 
Islamophobia and a climate of fear and hate against Muslims. In response the motion, Iqra received 
over 50,000 emails, including highly offensive, Islamophobic, racist, threatening, and sexist 
comments (Zine, Chakroun, and Abbas 2019, 4). The perception of incompatibility of secular 
values with Muslim beliefs often becomes part of the discussion. Muslim beliefs are considered 
obstacles to their integration.  
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This controversial debate about Muslims in Canada aligns with the same debate taking 
place all over the West. Since 2001, there are calls from different quarters to limit multiculturalism 
in general and Islamic practices in particular for being ‘contrary’ to Western values. The French 
niqab ban in 2010, the U.S. ban on several Muslim-majority countries in 2017, and the Quebec 
ban on face coverings and religious symbols in 2017 and 2019 were steps taken by state institutions 
to bring some religious practices ‘in line with Western values’. Casanova (2007) points toward 
debates accusing Islam of being fundamentalist, anti-modern, and incompatible with democracy. 
These steps, like many others, reflect the concerns the West has over Muslims’ ‘inability’ to 
endorse secularism.  
Muslims are assumed to be homogeneous. Regardless of ethnicity, religious denomination, 
language, race, and culture, they are given one identity: Muslims. In this paper, I am challenging 
this notion of Muslims ‘homogeneity’. Rogers Brubaker’s observations is very useful here. He 
consider Muslims not as “a homogeneous and solidarity group”. Instead, he says, they are “a 
heterogeneous category” (Brubaker 2013, 6). It is misleading to consider Muslim immigrants as a 
single group, they have different ethnic backgrounds, religious denominations, economic 
conditions, cultures, and languages. Many Muslims in the West consider religiosity to be part of 
their identity, even many of them are irreligious. Their family background, sense of belonging, 
and social environment, among other things, can be reasons for this identity. Casanova finds that 
Muslims in North America are diverse as immigrants from South Asia, Arab countries, and West 
Africa are unable to transform into a single Muslim ummah (2007, 19). There are congregational 
segregations and doctrinal differences among them. If they do not mix with other types of Muslims, 
their degree of endorsement toward secular institutions cannot be alike.  
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In this paper, I intend to investigate the relationship between secularism and the 
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Canada, which, over time, has established a presence in almost 
all major cities. This study aims to answer the question of whether identity loss and belonging to 
a religious persecuted community affect the degree of support of secularism. I will present findings 
of brief comparative studies on Alevis and Ismailis, both religious communities persecuted in their 
countries of origin, to support my argument. I base my argument on the rise of Islamic nationalism 
in Pakistan that excluded Ahmadis from the fold of Islam and put them on the course of 
persecution. I suggest that Ahmadis’ belonging to a persecuted religious community increases their 
support for secular institutions not only in their origin country but also in the country where they 
migrate to or take refuge in. I do not mean to challenge the general perception of the inverse 
relationship between religiosity and the support for secularism. I want to suggest that community-
level religiosity can produce positive feelings toward secular values because of its belonging to a 
persecuted minority. I argue that victimized at the hands of religious setups and persecution on the 
basis of religion leads to endorse a secular view of institutions with the hope of protection. It is 
essential to mention that the focus of my study is on a part of the broader concept of secularism. 
To measure the approaches of three persecuted Muslim minorities, I have focused on the separation 
of state and religion, the freedom to practice religion, and the non-interference of the state in 
religious matters. Alfred Stepan defines this concept of secularism as “twin toleration”, where 
democratic institutions, as well as different religions, have sufficient place to exercise their 
freedom without interference in each other’s domain. In such a pattern, religious institutions 
neither have the constitutional prerogative to influence the functioning of democratically elected 
representatives, nor it can deny freedoms to any citizens (Stepan 2011, 114–16). Talal Asad takes 
this concept of twine toleration further and considers role of a democratic religion essential in 
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modern society. He finds democratic religion in consistence with modernity to promote public 
debate like in the US. Such religion plays a positive political role in democracy, but it becomes 
threatening if it enters political debate “on its own terms” like in Egypt and Iran (ibid 183, 185). 
This concept of twine toleration and interplay between secular setup and religion is what Jamaat-
e-Ahmadiyya idealizes. Mirza Masroor Ahmad, the incumbent caliph of the Jamaat, in an 
interview in Toronto while defending Muslim Hijab and disapproving mixed-gatherings said: “The 
state should not interfere with matters which are religious” (Mansbridge 2016). It is part of 
Ahmadiyya religious teachings to abide by the laws and stay faithful to the country in which they 
live with expectation from the state not to interfere with their religiosity.  
In the discussion to follow, I begin with the West’s common understanding that Muslims, 
being ‘anti-modern’, are ‘against secularism’. Then, I move toward Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s 
vision of a secular Pakistan. I will explain how this vision was taken in and out of Parliament as a 
threat to Islam and was never let to become the state ideology. With the decline of the vision for a 
secular state, religious minorities in general and the Ahmadiyya community in particular were 
gradually pushed out of the democratic process; ultimately, this ended in their total exclusion from 
the Islamic fold in the process of nation-building. I then provide details about the position of 
Ahmadis in India and Bangladesh to show how different state setups (religious and secular) in the 
region having same colonial experience and sharing borders treat this religious minority. In the 
next part, I will give details of pull factors for Ahmadis in Canada and the trajectory of how their 
persecution increased the level of their support for secular values. To prove the change in their 
approach to secularism, I will provide details regarding their religiosity before and after their 
persecution was started. In conclusion, I will present brief comparative studies of Alevis and 
Ismailis to strengthen my hypothesis. I will unpack the discussion that there are different factors—
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belonging to a persecuted community being one of those—that affect Muslims’ endorsement of 
secularism.  
 
1.1 POSITIONALITY  
Born and raised in a Sunni Muslim family in Pakistan, I was unaware of any of the discrimination 
Ahmadis were facing until I pursued journalism as a profession. Two members of the Jamaat-e-
Ahmadiyya visited me at my office in 2006 and tried to convince me of their persecution for media 
coverage. Though unconvinced by them, I started paying attention and found them to be facing 
hardships at every step of life. After a week or so, a retired Ahmad school teacher was killed for 
his religion. He became my first story. Until June 2017, I wrote, as a reporter, extensively on the 
persecution of Ahmadis and other religious minorities.1 Several academic studies and media 
reports quoted my stories.2 Based on my work on religion in general and Ahmadis in particular, I 
received various fellowships, including one from the Alliance for Historical Dialogue and 
Accountability as a visiting scholar of the Institute of Religion, Culture and Public Life at 
                                                          
1 These are few of my significant stories on religious minorities in Pakistan i.e. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs 
and Jains:  
https://dailytimes.com.pk/124274/salam-family-had-reservations-over-renaming-sans-concrete-measures-for-
religious-freedom/ 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/17105/over-88-killed-in-twin-gun-and-bomb-attacks 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1401425/crosshairs-ahmadi-gunned-rahim-yar-khan-district 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1395510/illegal-detention-policeman-booked-forced-conversion 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1369066/youhanabad-lynching-christian-suspects-asked-convert-return-release 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/487631/missing-businesswoman-canadian-sikh-was-killed-the-day-she-landed-in-
pakistan 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/995808/after-factory-mob-torches-ahmadi-place-of-worship-in-jhelum-over-blasphemy-
allegations/ 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1419381/jain-temple-doubling-playground-cops-robbers 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1302960/dead-bodies-hindus-helpless-graveyard-encroachment-despite-court-order 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1262449/intolerance-ahmadi-place-worship-stormed-chakwal/ 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1255100/jamat-e-ahmadias-rabwa-office-raided-four-members-held-hate-speech/ 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1249793/assembly-session-mpas-assured-ahmadis-will-not-teach-islamic-studies/ 
2 https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=456309 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00litlinks/naim/txt_naim_ferozewala_2010.pdf 
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Columbia University and one from the Senior Journalists Seminar of East-West Centre based at 
Hawaii University to observe religious diversity in three different countries. During my stay in 
Canada, from September 2017 to August 2019, I stayed close to the Ahmadiyya community, which 
gave me an opportunity to observe how their religious and social life intersect with the secularity 
of Canada.  
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES  
This paper has benefited from secondary works on Muslim immigrants in North America; religion 
and politics in Pakistan, the historical trajectory of religious ideologies and persecution of the 
Ahmadiyya community. In addition to various academic materials, I have made use of information 
collected through personal experience with the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, the Greater 
Toronto Area, Ottawa, and Saskatoon. This personal experience comprises meetings with 
individuals and groups and participation in their religious and social events. To evaluate the shift 
of the Ahmadiyya approach from a religious to a secular state, I have used Ahmadi religious 
literature, including addresses and teachings of their Caliphs and Canadian leadership, and their 
newspapers and periodicals published in Pakistan and Canada. News items of some Canadian 
dailies are used also. To give an overview of Ahmadi exclusion and persecution in Pakistan, I have 
consulted some court cases, newspapers, and annual reports prepared by Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya. I 
have monitored different social media accounts of Pakistani immigrants in Canada to develop an 
idea of the discriminatory attitude of non-Ahmadi Pakistanis toward Ahmadis in Canada.  
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2. Islam and secularism: Western view of Muslim homogeneity  
 
It is a common notion in public debate and academic literature that Muslims are fundamentalists, 
anti-modern and against Western ‘norms’ hence oppose secularism. Particularly in North America 
Islam is considered as a “foreign” and “un-American” religion (Casanova 2007, 62). Secular 
Westerners seem welcoming each immigrant, regardless of race or religion, as long as they are 
able to accept and respect the Western ‘liberal and secular values’. Philips Jenkins points toward 
political rhetoric that terms coming of Muslim immigrants to Europe as Europe being Islamized. 
Part of this rhetoric is that Muslims are considered against secular values as well as against their 
Christian and Jewish neighbours (2009, 14). There is a common assumption among political circles 
of Europe that consider Muslims in the continent as a problem for being ‘barely compatible’ with 
liberal views. It is hard to consider Islam being idealized, secularized and harmonized in the “real 
world”. Liberal Europeans seem to raise questions toward Muslims, “Why do you need religion? 
Why can’t you live like us” (Jenkins 2002, 259)? Casanova finds today’s uniform anti-Muslim 
discourse in the West, similar to that against Catholicism in nineteenth-century (2007, 65). The 
perception of Muslims being fanatics, fundamentalists, and opposed to the secular values is based 
on understanding them as having fixed religious values that are considered permanently 
incompatible with Western values. Therefore the first question to deal with is whether all Muslims 
in the West are homogeneous and possessing fixed religious ethos contrary to secularism?  
The heterogeneity of Muslims, observed by Brubaker, is strengthened by Casanova. His 
observation is useful to challenge the Western notion that finds Muslims having fixed religion. 
Muslim immigrants in the United States are “extremely diverse” on the basis of their geographical 
background, in terms of their discursive religious traditions, and in terms of their socioeconomic 
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characteristics (Casanova 2007, 4). It is justified to say that over time, Islam has come in many 
shades of practice, some much more open and tolerant than others. Majority of the Muslims in the 
West, in general, and in North America, in particular, consider Islam as part of their family 
background. After moving to the non-Muslim West, Muslims redefine their understanding of what 
it meant to be a Muslim (Jenkins 2009, 261). Bouman and Ling’s findings is also useful to mention 
here. They find cultures and identities as not stable and fixed; rather they are syncretic, fluid and 
mixed in a modern and globalized age. Religion moves in its constant adaptation to new societal 
contexts, be this rapid social change or settlement in a different social-cultural environment 
(Bouma and Ling 2009, 351). Referring to different case studies conducted in USA, Germany and 
Canada, Martin finds young immigrants rarely focusing on religious customs and preservation 
(2009, 341–42). These findings support the hypothesis that if Muslims’ understanding of Islam is 
not fixed and they are heterogeneous, their attitude towards secular values in the West must differ 
on the basis of different contextual factors in countries of their origin that proves Western view of 
Muslim homogeneity as incorrect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
3. Desecularisation and Ahmadiyya Exclusion in Pakistan  
 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), founder of Ahmadiyya community, in 1888 had announced 
to be a divine person, Mujaddid, Mohaddis, Krishna, promised messiah and, ultimately in 1901, a 
subordinate prophet at his birthplace, Qadian, an area in Indian Punjab. He negated violent Jihad 
and openly expressed his support to the British government in India. The same year, he named his 
community as Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya, and on his request, the British government considered his 
community as a separate community from other Muslims in the census of 1901 (Munir 1954, 10; 
Saeed 2010, 112). After Ahmad’s death on May 26, 1908, his caliphate started with his close aide 
Hakeem Maulvi Nur-ud-Din becoming his first caliph. Din was the only caliph out of Ahmad’s 
family lineage among five caliphs so far (see Appendix 1). On Din’s death in March 1914, Ghulam 
Ahmad’s son Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad became the head of the Jamaat and second 
caliph. Mahmood introduced the structure of the Jamaat strictly hierarchical with the supreme 
authority of the incumbent caliph. The caliph cannot be removed or deposed as his position is for 
life. He has the power to excommunicate or oust members of the community for their 
‘objectionable’ behaviours and over nonpayment of mandatory monthly Chanda (financial 
contribution) (Saeed 2010, 124). Cantwell Smith described the Jamaat under Mahmood’s 
leadership in 1943 as “combining a purifying spirit of orthodox reform, having a tinge of the new 
liberalism, a mystic irrationalism, and the authoritarianism of new revelation” (1943, 324–25). It 
kept itself away from Pakistan movement (see Appendix 2), did not join Muslims and Hindus in 
the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) and, unlike majority Indians, always openly supported the 
British Colonizers.  
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Ghulam Ahmad’s prophecies, particularly his claim to be a prophet, and Jamaat’s political 
stances gave rise to the feeling of hostility and hatred toward the Jamaat. Though many of Indian 
Ulema had issued join fatwas terming Ahmad and his followers as kafirs (infidels) but first 
organized movement against the Jamaat was initiated in 1931 with the emergence of Majlis-e-
Ahrar. The conflict between the Ahrar and the Jamaat took birth largely due to political differences 
because both of them were carrying out ‘Kashmir cause’ from opposite camps. The Jamaat was 
continuing agitation from the platform of the All India Kashmir Committee with its caliph being 
chairman of the committee. Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal, famous poet and one of the leaders of 
Pakistan movement, was also a member of the committee (Munir 1954, 11). The Ahrar continued 
mobilizing Muslims of India against Ahmadis and All India Muslim League and was opposing 
Pakistan movement like Jamat-e-Islami. By 1935, the Ahrar succeeded in forming a mass 
movement against Ahmadis, and some individuals of Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim League also 
started expressing resentment against Ahmadis. Allama Iqbal in a letter to the editor of Calcutta 
daily The Statesman in June 1935 first time wrote Ahmadis as non-Muslims (Saeed 2010, 146). 
Punjab chapter of the Muslim League in 1938 had banned membership of Ahmadis considering 
them non-Muslims.  
As partition of India came closer, initially Ahmadis decided to settle in India to stay close 
to their sacred places in Qadian. Following the violence against Muslims in areas surrounding 
Qadian, the Ahmadis wrote letters to Indian leaders Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and 
Sardar Patel requesting them for protection. Having no reply from any of the leaders and following 
the intense rioting in Punjab, Ahmadiyya community moved to Lahore (Saeed 2010, 157–59). 
Before coming to Pakistan, Ahmadis wrote letters to Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan for assurance 
of protection but in vain. After coming to Pakistan uninvited, the Ahmadiyya community chose to 
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set up their own city – Rabwa – at a distance of about 100 miles away from Lahore. The 
community’s going away from the urban areas might be because of anti-Ahmadiyya movement 
which followed it to Pakistan as well. Now Rabwa is their spiritual headquarters in the world 
having their schools and health system. The Ahrar again launched an anti-Ahmadi campaign in 
Pakistan in 1953 but this time with active public support of key actors of the ruling party, the 
Muslim League, and major religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema Islam 
(Saeed 2010, 7).  
Majority of the scholars agree that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, proposed 
the concept of a secular Pakistan. During his life, before and after the independence of Pakistan, 
two parallel narratives – secular and Islamic – had been taking place in the Muslim League. In 
1938 Jinnah had disbanded Punjab chapter of the Muslim League for its banning membership of 
Ahmadis (Saeed 2010, 154). “Who am I to declare a person non-Muslim who calls himself a 
Muslim” was the reply of Jinnah in 1944 at a question of a journalist about his view on the religious 
status of Ahmadis (ibid 2010, 6). In his policy statement on August 11, 1947, Jinnah as first 
Governor-General of Pakistan categorically said there would be no relationship between the state 
and religion. He saw equal rights for every citizen regardless of religion. Jinnah did not just say it; 
he took practical decisions accordingly. He appointed Joginder Nath Mandal, a Hindu, and 
Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi, to his first cabinet. Keeping in mind that Pakistan has come 
into being as a state for the Muslim minority of the subcontinent, he proposed that every religion 
should have freedom of practice, but it should have no political role in affairs of the state. Based 
on previous experience of communal and religious clashes between Hindus and Muslims, Jinnah 
had a clear idea of a political religion that would “undermine civil society or individual liberties” 
(Asad 2003, 182), therefore he envisioned separation of religion and the state. Deviation from 
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Jinnah’s vision has proved disastrous for minorities. There were almost 23 percent non-Muslim 
citizens in 1947 and now they are reduced to less than four percent including Ahmadis (Ispahani 
2017a, 9).  
The day Jinnah expressed the vision of a secular state, moves within and out of the 
parliament were initiated against it. The only segments of society to defend it were religious 
minorities, including Hindus and Christians. Jinnah’s speech was followed by the debate to finalize 
the design of the flag of Pakistan. Non-Muslim members of the assembly “unanimously expressed 
their disapproval of the flag” saying that they had not been consulted in this regard and the 
proposed flag being almost identical with the party flag of the Muslim League was representing 
the Muslim community. Their objections were rejected, and the flag was finalized through a 
majority vote of Muslim members of the assembly (Saeed 2010, 174). Jinnah did not intervene in 
the debate. We can say that the flag debate, the first-ever debate in the Constituent Assembly, and 
decision on it decided a course of Muslim leaders towards religious nationalism, putting religious 
minorities aside.  
After the death of Jinnah, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution in 
1949 (see Appendix 3), which provided the basis of Islamization in Pakistan. Three out of its 
eleven clauses, give explicit reference to Islam. It begins with “sovereignty over the entire universe 
belongs to Allah Almighty”. Clause four says “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, 
tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed”. The resolution, 
providing the aims and objects of the Constitution, became the preamble of the future constitutions 
of Pakistan and proved to be a Muslim nationalist discourse. It provided the basis of Islamization 
in legal codes of Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that Zafrullah Khan vehemently defended the 
Objectives Resolution in and out of the parliament. Encouraged with the passage of the Objectives 
14 
 
Resolution, by 1953 the clerics started demanding inclusion of Islam in law and state policy. To 
spearhead their move for Islamization, they took anti-Ahmadi elements with them and ended up 
initiating a mass movement against Ahmadis. By the end of February 1953, riots began. Ahmadis 
were attacked, their properties were destroyed, and some lives lost (Feldman 1967, 41–42). The 
army had to intervene, and the country witnessed the first martial law to quell this religious 
movement. As a result of this move, the vision for a secular state had become anti-secular. A 
judicial commission was formed to determine responsibility for the riots. The commission, while 
recording statements of the anti-Ahmadi clerics, asked them whether Jinnah’s concept of secular 
Pakistan was acceptable to them and every one replied in negative. Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi, 
representing the Jamaat-e-Islami, responded that “a state based on this idea is the creature of the 
devil” (Munir 1954, 203). The state’s policy of accommodation towards Ahmadis in 1954 turned 
out to be a policy of exclusion in 1974. The state gave in to the demands of the protesters and 
through a constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims under article 260(3a, 3b) 
of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.3 There was not a single member in the 
parliament to represent the interests of minorities, especially Ahmadis.  
Ten years later, in 1984, religious freedom of Ahmadis was further curtailed through a 
presidential Ordinance (see Appendix 4). Section 298-B and 298-C were inserted into Pakistan 
Penal Code 1860 through this ordinance. Under these sections, “misuse of epithets, descriptions 
and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or places” was prescribed as punishable for 
                                                          
3Article 260 of the Constitution:  
(3a) “Muslim” means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and 
unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not 
believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any 
sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and 
(3b) “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, 
Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or the Lahori Group who call themselves 
‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes. 
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Ahmadis and their right of self-identification was taken away by barring them from “posing like 
Muslims”. The state policy of accommodation, which was turned into the policy of exclusion in 
1974, ended up to be a policy of criminalization in 1984. During General Zia’s tenure, apart from 
several anti-Ahmadi and Islamic provisions, a controversial set of blasphemy law was introduced. 
The most controversial part of the blasphemy law is section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code, which 
was introduced in 1986 providing life imprisonment for derogatory remarks in respect of Prophet 
Muhammad. In 1991, during the premiership of Nawaz Sharif, the punishment of life 
imprisonment was replaced with capital punishment.4 As section 295-C exclusively deals with 
respect of the prophet of Islam, Ahmadis and other religious minorities in Pakistan become victims 
of it. This gradual process of desecularisation and rise of religious nationalism has not only 
strengthened the religious sentiment in successfully dictating the religious content of state policies 
but also excluded the religious minorities from political life. Now there are countless religious 
organizations across the country carrying out anti-Ahmadi or anti-blasphemy agenda with special 
focus on non-Muslims.  
Legal steps taken by the state give a sense of legitimacy to violence against Ahmadis, who 
have been continuously victimized at the hands of the state and vigilantism. According to the 
annual Ahmadiyya Persecution Report 2019, in Pakistan since 1984, 262 Ahmadis have been 
killed, and 388 have been assaulted. Meanwhile, 28 of their mosques have been demolished, 39 
sealed by the state, 23 set on fire or partially damaged, and 17 forcibly occupied by mainstream 
Muslims. Fifty-eight incidents occurred in which the government barred Ahmadis from 
                                                          
4 Section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code:  
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or 
insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall 
be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 
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constructing mosques. Additionally, the dead bodies of 39 Ahmadis have been forcibly exhumed 
from common cemeteries, and 69 of their burials have been halted by anti-Ahmadi elements 
(Ahmadiyya 2019, 165). All Ahmadi publications, including weeklies, periodicals, and religious 
books are banned in Pakistan (Tanveer 2013). Police arrest staff and confiscates printed facilities 
whenever it finds them printing Ahmadi material (ibid. 2016). They cannot perform their religious 
practices openly, and neither say call for prayer nor call their place of worship as a mosque 
(Ispahani 2017b, 5).  
This rise of Islamisation as a state policy is a systematic “desecularisation” that shows how 
distinct notion of citizenship, national identity and religious politics have become part of the state 
(Saeed 2013, 62). This process of desecularisation and rise of Islamisation has led to make the 
religious front as a pressure group in dictating the state policies and to the slow and gradual exit 
of all religious minorities in general and Ahmadis in particular from organized political life. 
Ahmadis cannot cast their vote nor contest election at any level. These steps have given way to the 
politics of street-power that help the charged mobs to target religious minorities with impunity 
under the pretext of blasphemy allegations. Politics of fear and exclusion of voices of dissent are 
another outcomes of this historical process. Any politician, rights activist or journalists who speak 
in favour of Ahmadis come under hot waters. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came under 
severe criticism for condemning attacks on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore in 2010, which left 
more than 88 worshippers dead (Dawn 2010). Apart from bad economic conditions, scarcity of 
better jobs, and better education opportunities, the above mentioned ouster of Ahmadis from the 
nationalist discourse have become a major factor to push them out of the country. To understand 
the historical process of desecularisation in Pakistan and the treatment of the Ahmadiyya Muslim 
community, studying Bangladesh and India, which comprised one country before 1947 and share 
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the borders and history of colonialism, will be helpful. Therefore before discussing Ahmadiyya 
arrival in Canada, I will discuss the interplay of religion and secularism and situation of Ahmadis 
in rest of these two countries of the subcontinent.  
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4. Religion, Secularism and Ahmadis in the Subcontinent 
 
Supporters of secularism say that a state having secular democratic values has an advantage over 
one which is based on the religious notion. They consider secularism to have nothing to do with 
ideological clashes which theological opinions have. It is considered objective, neutral and much 
more palpable to diverse people living together at one place. How the legal codes of a state should 
deal with society having highly religious people, they ask. The critics of secularism say it has 
nothing to do with ethics. It takes ethics from religion but does not acknowledge. The study of 
some of the countries of the subcontinent seems an excellent location to understand how religious 
minorities are being treated under theocracy and secularism. The aim here is not to prove 
secularism better than the religion or vice versa but to present a true picture by comparing countries 
with similar historical and socio-economic contexts that have adopted one option or the other. A 
comprehensive study of Pakistan can be significant in understanding the state of affairs, but 
comparing it with India and Bangladesh would provide a more robust and proper understanding 
with a focus on violation or provision of minority rights particularly those of Ahmadis. As Pakistan 
and Bangladesh (East Pakistan from 1947 to 1971) were separated from India for the religious 
freedom of the Muslim minority, a study of minorities’ rights in these all three countries shows 
that new border lines created new minority and majority groups with religious clashes staying 
there, with some variations.  
 
4.1 INDIA 
India has a secular identity and an outstanding record as a functioning liberal democracy in South 
Asia, if not in the Third World. At least in its legal codes and as part of its state policy, it has put 
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several steps in place for protection of the minorities. Various articles of its constitution guarantee 
different freedoms. Apart from the state assistance to minority institutions, under article 30, they 
are given right to establish and administer their educational institutions while article 26 deals with 
the freedom to manage religious affairs. Secular image of its constitution also reflects in other legal 
and policy codes of the state. There are various institutions like National Commission for 
Minorities, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, National Minorities 
Development and Finance Corporation, and National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to 
empower and to protect the minorities. Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir (at least in documents), 
animist and Christians in the northeast are provided autonomy (Manchanda 2009).  
India has witnessed severe communal clashes, including a series of riots in almost all over 
India after 1992-demolition of historic Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. Most of the riots were among 
Muslims and Hindus, which took thousands of lives. In its northeast areas, minorities lack 
protection. Rise of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister since 2014 has become synonymous with the 
rise of Hindu nationalism in India which put a serious question mark over the protection of 
minorities, especially Muslims, and India’s claim to be a secular state. Legislations in different 
states to ban cow slaughter, revocation of the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, 
and approval to build Ram Mandir, where Babri Mosque once was, are a few among many steps 
to polarize the India society and to undermine its identity of a secular state. The incidents like 
demolition of Babri mosque by Hindu hardliners and the subsequent decision of the High Court in 
their favour demonstrated that state and judiciary, when necessary, find it justified to give priority 
to the majority religion in taking decisions over their commitment to the secular legal codes and 
promises made under this umbrella (Mufti 2007).  
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Ahmadis are recognized as Muslims by the state of India, but they face threats and violence 
from different Muslim groups. They face calls for social boycott, physical attacks, and threats to 
limit their religious activities. Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, and 
Majlis-e-Ahrar are major Muslim organizations carrying out a campaign to declare Ahmadis as 
non-Muslims in India. However, Ahmadis express a sense of satisfaction toward Indian authorities. 
“[I]n order to avoid conflict with Indian authorities”, the community tend to downplay acts of 
violence against it (Immigration and Refugee Board Canada 2015). When there are anti-Muslim 
riots in India, Ahmadis are lumped together with other Muslims. Due to countrywide protests over 
anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment Act, Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya postponed its annual convention 
scheduled for December 27 to 29, 2019. As India is the birthplace of the founder of Jamaat-e-
Ahmadiyya and the origin of their movement, annual convention India has status of a pilgrimage 
for Ahmadis.  
Despite all these anti minority circumstances, it is not justified to term India as a religious 
state. Its vibrant civil society is what differentiates it from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Last year’s 
countrywide protests participated by every segment of society against Citizenship Amendment Act 
are an indication of a spirit instilled among the citizens by the secular identity of the state. No 
doubt India’s strong and continuous democracy is also a fruit of secularism unlike in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Mahendra Lowati is rightful to say that Hindu nationalists would become more 
encouraged and violent to repress minorities in India if Hinduism is given the status of a state 
religion in India like Islam in Bangladesh and Pakistan (2017, 274). Secular identity of the state 
provides a sense of belonging to its minorities which would have been taken away by giving 
Hinduism status of the state religion in India. The Ahmadiyya issue has its roots in India since the 
late nineteenth century, but India did not take any serious discriminatory steps against them despite 
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repeated demands from some significant groups of its more than 172 million Muslim citizens. 
However, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan excluded them in less than three decades by providing 
a sense of superiority to its majority Muslims who are now in a position to dictating the state. No 
doubt, it is the secular status of India that makes Ahmadis have a sense of satisfaction towards 
state institutions.  
 
4.2 BANGLADESH  
Bangladesh, being a Muslim majority country, has Islam as its state religion. It was formerly known as East 
Pakistan until separation in 1971. After its independence, first Constitution of 1972 adopted the secular 
status of the state in lines with Jinnah’s vision. However, the first constitutional amendment of 1979 
revoked the secular status, and in 1988 Islam was declared as the state religion. High Court and Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh declared the removal of secularism from the Constitution as illegal, respectively in 
2005 and 2011, but the status of the state remained Islamic (Bhuiyan 2017, 1). These constitutional steps 
toward the rise of Islam in Bangladesh, set the tone of the majority Muslims. These steps provided ground 
for reemergence to Islamic political parties including Islamic Okye Jyote and Jamaat-e-Islami. Religious 
minorities, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, which are 11 percent of the total population, and sect 
within Islami like Ahmadis, start facing discrimination at state and social levels. More than one million 
cases of the land grabbing from Hindus are pending adjudication. Incidents of discrimination against 
minorities are increased since the state became Islamic. Millions of Hindus and Buddhists have emigrated 
to India for life (Lawoti 2017, 272).  
Ahmadis, who are 0.1 percent of the population in Bangladesh, have been facing hate campaign 
and movements to declare them as non-Muslims in lines with Pakistan. Anti-Ahmadi movement in 
Bangladesh started in 1977 with an attack on their annual convention in Barahmanbaria, a district of 
Chittagong division, by anti-Ahmadiyya extremists. A fresh spate of attacks and threats took rise against 
Ahmadis in the 1990s. At least 12 Ahmadis were injured in 1992 when a procession of more than 1000 
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charged affiliates of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat attacked Ahmadiyya complex in Dhaka. Rooms were ransacked, 
valuables were damaged, and books and other literature were set on fire. Some of their mosques have been 
demolished or grabbed, and they continuously face calls for social boycotts. Conferences, public meetings 
and processions organized by the Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and often participated by speakers from Pakistan 
and India have a significant contribution to spreading hate against Ahmadis (Watch 2005).  
The discussion shows that the state’s religious status becomes a tool for discrimination 
within the hands of the majority. In contrast, countries with secular identity try to protect minority 
rights or at least minimize violence. Though Ahmadis of India left for Pakistan in 1947 because of 
a lack of protection, it is the secular setup in India that gave them a sense of security and 
satisfaction over the time, unlike Pakistan. A lot of Sikhs emigrated from India after operation 
Blue Star in 1984, but at the state level, they were not facing any exclusion. In India, communal 
riots have been occurring ever since their independence and have taken thousands of lives. The 
representation of high-caste Hinduism mediates the nation’s public image, and those who do not 
fit into that high-caste position are considered religious minorities (Chatterjee 1992). No doubt 
these characteristics undermine the claim of secularism in India but do not remove it altogether. A 
secular state does not and cannot guarantee peace and toleration; it puts into play some legal 
frameworks to regulate violence with an ambition to eliminate it (Asad 2003, 8). Several 
institutions in India that protect minorities keep the state from following the exclusion course like 
Pakistan. Giving religious status to a state hampers equality and undermines tolerance towards 
religious minorities. State institutions based on secular ideas are more likely to strengthen 
democratic institutions like those found in India. Contrarily, Pakistan presents a bleak picture of 
its democracy with multiple coups and military influence, even during democratic setups. In 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, religious orientations are to blame for the shrinking democratic space 
for minorities. Prioritizing any one religion means undermining others. It provides an underlying 
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justification for making biases against minorities a part of legal and state policies, whereas this is 
not likely the case with a secular state. 
Going through studies of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, one could say that the post-
enlightenment era often encounters a precarious block of minorities. The situation in these 
dominions draws attention towards the challenges posed to the minority question under the agenda 
of modernity and globalization, which Amir Mufti calls “treacherous and heavily policed oceans 
that separate the narratives and figures of modernity in Europe from their reappearances in the 
colonies” (Mufti 2007, 10). I do not mean to find reasons why secular narratives in the sub-
continent, the former British colony, are missing, unlike in the West, but to draw attention toward 
the similarities in how these former colonies ruled by one colonizer are dealing with minorities. 
One thing is clear – although the situation of Ahmadis is more favourable in India than in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, the factors attracting them towards the West are missing in India too. 
The protection and the sense of belonging that Ahmadis feel in the secular setup of Canada and 
the factors allowing them to establish a distinctive identity and religious freedom form the central 
themes of the next part of the paper.  
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5. Ahmadis arrive in Canada and make it home 
 
Ahmadi missionaries have been coming to Canada since 1966; however, when Pakistan declared 
them non-Muslims in 1974, they started migrating to Canada. After the 1984 ban on their religious 
practices, a massive wave of Ahmadi emigrants began moving to western countries. Attracted by 
Canada’s religious and cultural diversity, a large number of Ahmadis, fleeing persecution, have 
made it home. Their religious body was registered as Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at Canada Inc. in 
Canada with the arrival of its first missionary in 1966. The community purchased a 25-acre piece 
of land in 1985 at Vaughan, GTA, where they built a mosque and the Canada mission house. Now 
they have built their locality comprising 260 homes at a 50 acre piece of land adjacent to the 
mosque. Its nine streets are named after Ahmadi religious leaders and notables (Malik 2013).  
There are about 30,000 Ahmadis in Canada, and they have a very closely-knit and 
organized setup, like in other more than 200 countries of the world. They have one administrative 
head in Canada who is called Ameer. Under his leadership, there are 11 regional and local Ameers 
supervising 116 chapters functioning across Canada. Other than several mosques operating in 
existed structure, it has constructed eight prominent mosques in different cities. The biggest 
mosque in North America is Baitul Islam, an Ahmadi mosque in Maple, Ontario, which was 
inaugurated in 1992 (Gualtieri 2004, 7). Other major Ahmadi mosques are in Brampton, 
Scarborough, Calgary, Vancouver, Lloydminster, Regina and Saskatoon. Ahmadis are educated, 
using modern technologies and in good books of mainstream political parties. Local and national 
politicians willingly participate in their religious activities, which continue throughout the year. 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and many members of the parliament participated in their annual 
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convention on July 09, 2019, and virtual Iftar (Muslim fast-breaking) organized by Ahmadis on 
April 23, 2020. Majority of the Ahmadis in Canada have a sense of satisfaction and support toward 
the system yet keep on trying to seek special attention by distancing themselves from fanatic, 
terrorist, and radical assumptions associated with Islam. Michael Nijhawan explains different 
aspects of Ahmadi identity in Canada as saying that they consider their community different from 
other Muslim groups, a model minority deserving special attention for being, what they say, fully 
integrated into the Canadian society. They appreciate Canada for being “welcoming society for 
ethnic and religious diversity” where they can perform their religious practices freely and can build 
their religious institutions (Nijhawan 2016, 237).  
The state of Canada through different steps make them realize that they are accommodated. 
In 1990, the Ontario government built a 14-story building in Toronto for Ahmadiyya refugees. The 
building, comprising 166 apartments and a prayer hall of 2500 square feet, was handed over to 
Ahmadis for their exclusive use. The government has been facing criticism for this exclusive 
project for any ethnic community as no non-Ahmadi can live there (“Muslims Only” 2015). The 
secular judicial system of Canada accommodates Ahmadi refugees in deciding their refugee 
claims. The quasi-judicial tribunals of the Immigration and Refugee Board functions in 
consultation with the Jamaat’s administration to deal with cases of Ahmadi refugees (Soennecken 
2009, 2). The IRB officials are well aware of the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan as some of them 
have visited Pakistan to have a better understanding of their persecution. Before going to the 
question of violence, the IRB members ask the claimant to prove his religious identity. The IRB 
verifies the religious identity of any Ahmadi refugee claimant from Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya, which 
issues certificates of authenticity in this regard (Nijhawan 2016, 114). In this course of the 
assessment of religious identity, justifiably, it can be said that Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya has proved 
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itself as an integral component of the secular system. Along with its efforts to build its image of a 
community able to assimilate into Canadian culture, the Jamaat has successfully recognized itself 
as a persecuted and peaceful community in comparison with its opponent Muslim groups hailing 
from its perpetrating society.  
While trying to differentiate themselves from other Muslims and trying to establish their 
separate identity as Ahmadi Muslims and racialized subjects, they face a sense of heretic otherness 
that pervades Muslim diasporic politics. Allegations of being close to the Ahmadiyya community 
are enough for any Pakistani immigrant politician to lose Muslim vote. Hifza Musa, a Pakistani-
Canadian, lost elections for the nomination of Liberal Party MPP for Mississauga Erin Mills riding 
on March 17, 2018. Her rival candidate, Imran Mian, also hailing from Pakistan, through social 
media and corner meetings propagated against her of being a supporter of Ahmadis. Resultantly 
Mian won, and Musa lost with a margin on 736 votes. Nijhawan points out discrimination against 
Ahmadi students at the hands of Muslim students at York University. They are not allowed to 
attend the function of Muslim students’ organization, and anti-Ahmadiyya leaflets are circulated 
at the campus. Posters that advertised political events organized by Ahmadiyya students 
disappeared mysteriously only a day after they were put up on the campus (ibid, 238). Members of 
the Jamaat also face hate campaigns through social media (see Appendix 5). Ahmadis usually 
ignore such hate campaigns or respond logically. They avoid clash while some individuals prefer 
not disclosing their religious affiliation fearing social alienation or loss of a job. They find Taqiyya 
as Islamic justification for not disclosing their real belief. Taqiyya is a practice performed by 
“minority or otherwise disadvantaged groups of Muslims who fear negative repercussions should 
their real faith become known” (Virani 2011, 99).  
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Canada has a special status for accommodating Ahmadi refugees. After attacks on two 
Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on May 28, 2010, which left more than 80 worshippers dead, former 
immigration minister Jason Kenney offered and accepted families of all victims as refugees in 
Canada. There are various statements of Ahmadi caliphs in appreciation of Canada and its 
inclusive values. In June 1987, their fourth caliph termed Canada as his home. Impressed by its 
being welcoming, he said: “It is my prayer that Canada becomes the world and the world becomes 
Canada”. He advised his followers to keep up Canadian values and defend them for these are very 
precious (Tahir Ahmad 1986). Other than freedom of religion, better employment opportunities, 
options for a good education, and cultural liberties can be significant pull factors.  
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6. Ahmadiyya religiosity and their move toward secularism 
 
No doubt, the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya is peaceful, law-abiding, non-violent, anti-Jihad, cooperative 
to the state, and moderate but looking at its past shows some contrasts. In its initial days, it had 
been changing its stances as per requirements. During its initial few decades, it had realised the 
necessity to build an image of a liberal movement. Cantwell Smith’s observation is very useful. 
He said, “its propaganda in Europe and America omits much of the backwardness which is evident 
at home and includes a large share of liberal ideology” (Smith 1943, 326). Jamaat’s literature of 
pre-1970s, when they were still constitutional Muslims in Pakistan, showed their tendency toward 
fanaticism. Their second caliph Mirza Bashirudin Ahmad Mahmood in April 1944, in an address 
to his followers said: “with the grace of God, there would be a day when countries of the world 
would be under our control” (Ahmed 1944, 285). Urging his followers for the aggressive stance, 
he said, “Blood of the Muslims who died fighting in Spain is demanding us for revenge. Only true 
Muslims will go and raise the Islamic flag there” (Ahmed 1944, 268). It was the time when he 
started raising voice for all Muslims of the subcontinent (Saeed 2010, 154), unlike his previous 
stance when he was siding with the British colonizers.  
Jamaat’s tendency of theocracy became more evident after the independence of Pakistan 
when it started campaigning to make Pakistan as an Islamic state. They had been highlighting news 
stories and opinion pieces in their weeklies and dailies to establish a public opinion in favour of 
an Islamic system. The headline of the lead story of Jamaat’s daily Al-Fazal February 15, 1948, 
said: “Democracy in Pakistan would be based on pure Islamic principles” (see Appendix 6). The 
lead story of Al-Fazal January 10, 1948, said: “Politics in West Punjab would be based on Sharia” 
(see Appendix 7). Such propaganda newspapers carry out “for political, economic, or social 
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policies” (Riegel 1935, 204). Ahmadi newspapers were carrying out propaganda by giving 
relatively more space and prominence to typical stories they liked. They were applying editorial 
discrimination by including analysis in the news stories in a bid to influence the policymaking. It 
does not mean that a newspaper cannot prioritise some information over the other. However, 
giving a particular angle and space to one kind of stories, one after the other, and making the 
analysis part of the story shows that the media outlet is striving to bring into existence a state of 
society which it believes to be most advantageous to the people it serves.  
When the British government gave Kashmir, a Muslim majority area, to a Hindu ruler in 
1946, Muslims ended up facing severe discriminations. Most of their worship places were gone 
under the state control, they had no right to preach, cow slaughter was banned, and their 
representation in government services was next to nothing. These factors, among others, gave birth 
to Muslim agitation (Jalal 2000, 353–55). Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya aggressively participated in that 
agitation. Ahmadiyya caliph became chairman of Kashmir Muslim Conference, a Muslim platform 
to struggle for Kashmir, on the recommendation of Allama Muhammad Iqbal. To support the 
Kashmir cause, Ahmadis not only spent money but also sent their lawyers as volunteers to help 
Muslim inmates. In 1948, when Kashmir conflict remerged, Ahmadis took a drastic step in the 
negation of their basic ideology against violent Jihad. The Jamaat’s caliph established a militia – 
Furqan Battalion – and gave it at the disposal of Pakistan Army to fight for Kashmir (Khan 2015, 
115–16). Apart from showing loyalties to Pakistan and Islam, there is another reason behind 
Ahmadis being interested in Kashmir. It is a place of reverence for them because their founder 
claimed that Jesus was buried there, and it is part of their ideology that the founder of the Jamaat 
was the second coming of Jesus. Since the beginning, Kashmir has been a central place in the sub-
continent for Ahmadi missionary activities (Lavan 1973, 146). Hakeem Nur-ud-Din, a close aide 
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of the founder of the Jamaat and his first caliph, had served as chief royal hakeem 
(physician/herbalist) to two predecessors of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, for 
fifteen years (Khan 2015, 97).  
It is justified to say that Ahmadis, among other Islamists, played their role in providing 
Islamic basis for future constitutions of the newly liberated dominion by supporting the Objectives 
Resolution. Their approach towards blasphemy was not different than that of the other Muslims of 
Pakistan. Sir Zafrullah Khan, the first foreign Minister of Pakistan and a devout Ahmadi, expressed 
his protest against a statement of UN Assistant Secretary-General Benjamin Cohen in October 
1950 considering it blasphemous and outrageous. Cohen apologised (see Appendix 8).  
Their exclusion from the folds of Islam in 1974 and the declaration of their religious services of 
being criminal in 1984 brought a significant shift into their approach. They started raising voice 
for human rights and democracy. After 1984 ban on the public performance of their religious 
practices, Ahmadiyya Gazette Canada in its June 1984 issue published the relevant part of Jinnah’s 
August 11 speech and termed the ban contradictory to it (see Appendix 9). The editorial board of 
the Gazette termed the ban as “suicidal course” for Pakistan and “a blot on the true Islamic 
teachings of tolerance and humanity”. During the initial months of the ban, Ahmadis seemed 
accepting Jinnah’s vision for a secular state halfheartedly. They were terming the ban as a negation 
of Jinnah’s vision as well as against teachings of Islam. They still were thinking of Pakistan to be 
an Islamic state for which they had already struggled. Paragraph on page 3 of the Gazette is suitable 
to quote here.  
 
“Any state which claims to be a[n] ‘Islamic’ has additional 
obligation to guarantee the fundamental rights provided under the 
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injunctions of the Holy Qur’an and teachings and example of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad. In the 37 years of Pakistan’s history, all 
of her constitutions have contained statements intended to protect 
and safeguard “freedom to profess religion and to manage religious 
institutions.” 
 
With the intensity of discrimination, persecution and target killings of Ahmadis, their 
ideology of having an Islamic state system faded away, and they started taking refuge under secular 
systems. After 1985, there is not an instance of their demand for an Islamic state. They started 
adopting West’s definition of human rights and raised the slogan of “Humanity Zindabad” (long 
live humanity) on June 8, 1989, in Canada. On October 9, 1980, their third caliph announced 
Jamaat’s slogan as “Love for All, Hatred for None” in Spain while inaugurating a mosque (Farhat 
2013). This was the Spain against which Jamaat’s second caliph had been calling for Jihad in 1944. 
In 1995, they set up their non-governmental organization Humanity First with headquarter in 
Vaughan, GTA. It is functioning successfully in more than 50 countries. They claim to have the 
greatest food bank in Canada for the needy under this charity. Though 99 percent of its staff are 
Ahmadis, they say it has nothing to do with the Jamaat.  
With coming closer to the secular values, they distanced themselves from fanatic views 
associated with some Muslim groups. Their views toward blasphemy were altogether changed by 
1989 from those expressed by Sir Zafrullah Khan in 1950. In 1989 almost all over the Muslim 
world there were bad feelings against Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses after Khomeini’s 
killing fatwa. At a public forum, Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya Canada leader Nasim Mehdi on behalf of 
the Jamaat openly expressed disagreement with demands for Rushdie’s killing (see Appendix 10).  
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It is clear to suggest that with the increase of the level of persecution in the country of 
origin and sense of acceptance, belonging and protection under the secular setups in the West, 
brought gradual increase on their support for secularism. Though after 1984’s ban on their public 
religious practices, Ahmadis started making demands for a Pakistan in accordance with Jinnah’s 
vision but in 1996 their caliph not only supported Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan but also termed 
secularism as the best system for the world (M. T. Ahmad 1996). In his book “Relationship 
between Religion and Politics in Islam” published in 1991, the caliph termed secular system 
suitable for the world. Moreover, he said Sharia would be discriminatory to the non-Muslim 
citizens in Pakistan as well as in the rest of the world (T. Ahmad 2018, 21–23).  
Alfred Stepan defines this concept of secularism as “twin toleration”, where democratic 
institutions, as well as different religions, have sufficient place to exercise their freedom without 
interference in each other’s domain. In such a pattern, religious institutions neither have the 
constitutional prerogative to influence the functioning of democratically elected representatives, 
nor it can deny freedoms to any citizens (Stepan 2011, 114–16).  
As already mentioned, I have focused on the separation of state and religion, freedom to 
practice religion and non-interference of the state with religion, which is a portion of the broader 
concept of secularism appealing to the Ahmadiyya community. Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya leader’s 
saying about Canada that “being a multi-ethnic community it has to be tolerant” and “the 
government should not interfere with the matters which are religious” is exactly in line with 
Stepan’s concept of twin toleration. Not only Ahmadis but also all other religious minorities get 
their legal demands fulfilled under Canada’s policy of toleration. Selby, Barras and Beaman term 
this situation, particularly for Muslims, as “accommodation on demand” in Canada having the 
latent empowered position of Christian norms (2018, 123–24). Presence of this underlying 
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empowered position of Christian norms is given importance in the public sphere which can be 
measured through different indicators, one of which is different mandating paid public holidays 
on Christmas and Good Friday for the majority religion, unlike the minority religions. Another 
contradiction to Canadian equality, being practised toward non-religious citizens, is in its Criminal 
Code 1985. Section 319(1) of the Code criminalizes hate speech, but its sub-section 3(b) gives an 
exception to hate speech “based on a belief in a religious text”. So, on the basis of religious text, 
any religious person has the right to carry out hate speech, unlike an irreligious person. These 
potential differences can demand attention in future to be aligned with Canadian equality and 
diversity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Religious freedom, a crowning achievement of secularism and guaranteeing peaceful coexistence 
of religiously diverse population (Mahmood 2012), attracts the persecuted communities by 
guarantying them protection as well as the freedom to practice religion. The secularism 
disapproves preference of one religious group over the others as well as discourages intolerance. 
Persecuted under religious ideologies, Ahmadis over the time distanced themselves from hardline 
ideas of religion and strengthened their identity as a democratic and inclusive community in 
Canada. They are in good books of the state system and are accommodated accordingly. Just as 
they are persecuted in countries of their origin, they face discrimination and hate in Canada too, 
but here they do not accuse the state system of having any role in it. This factor of discrimination 
helps them in defining their course of political, social and religious life. In trying not to follow the 
perpetrators’ suit, Ahmadis try to exhibit secular values to prove themselves more Canadian than 
the other Muslims. They usually prefer not to mix with their non-Ahmadi countrymen. They do 
not vote for a political candidate who has the support of the other Muslims. There is no possibility 
of Ahmadis to vote for a Muslim candidate either. Therefore they do not support any single 
political party; they choose suitable candidates instead. Priority for a suitable candidate is to be 
favourable for Ahmadis; otherwise, they prefer a non-religious candidate. In Brampton mayoral 
elections of 2018, Ahmadis did not support Patrick Brown, the incumbent mayor, for him being 
close to Pakistani immigrants. They supported Liberal Party candidate Linda Jeffery for two 
reasons. First, she was not much favourite to Pakistani diaspora and second, she had promised 
Ahmadis to try to get the parking space for their newly constructed mosque – Masjid Mubarik – 
in Brampton. Local hate campaigns are also a factor which urge them to establish their separate 
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identity as liberal Muslims by distancing themselves from Muslims facing stereotypes like violent, 
conservative, anti-democracy and bearers of fixed religious ideas.  
As a consequence of Ahmadis belonging to a persecuted minority, it is justified to say that 
endorsement for secular institutions among persecuted communities is more than other Muslims. 
To strengthen this finding, the situation of two other Muslim persecuted communities – Ismailis 
and Alevis – is worth mentioning. After decades of persecution, Ismailis and Alevis have distanced 
themselves from religious setups and strengthened their identity as democratic communities not 
only in the host countries but also in countries of their origin. Particularly Ismailis, like Ahmadis, 
have influenced certain lobbying groups in the West with their portrayal of liberal interpretation 
of Islam. In Canada, they are in good books of the state system.  
 
7.1 ISMAILIS 
The Nazari Ismaili community commonly referred to as the Ismailis, has a long history of facing 
oppression, genocide, and persecution at the hands of Muslim dynasties and rulers either they were 
Ottoman, Safavid, Ummayyad, Abbasid, Ayyubid, Seljuq, Mongol or Timurid. After a long history 
of persecution, in large number, they move to the West and live in security and enjoy full religious 
freedom (Gnosis 2015). First Ismaili arrived in Canada in 1952 from Pakistan. Like to Ahmadis, 
Canada has a special status for Ismailis too. In the 1970s when Uganda’s Muslim president Idi 
Amin expelled Ismailis, Canada’s then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promised Agha Khan that 
they would accept 5000 Ismailis. Canada has the largest Ismaili settlement in the West, with its 
population between 70,000 and 80,000. Agha Khan has also set up a museum in Toronto dedicated 
to Muslim culture and art. He has opened the Global Center for Pluralism in Ottawa (Dewji 2018, 
81–84). Khan’s views about Canada being accommodating are similar to those of the Ahmadi 
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caliph. He advised his followers to consider Canada as their home. Impressed by its 
accommodation of different persecuted communities, Agha Khan referred to Canada as a model 
for the world (Dewji 2018, 93). Ahmadis and Ismailis equally consider the secular setup of Canada 
important to them and their leaderships keep on stressing on assimilation.  
 
7.2 ALEVIS 
Resentment against Alevis, continuing since the early 20th century, was resumed after the death 
of Kamal Ataturk in the late 1970s when the state of Turkey accused some of the community’s 
youngsters of carrying out anti-state activities. Apart from persecution, the state was not even 
ready to give them the identity of a minority (Grigoriadis 2006). In the last three decades, which 
can be termed as the rise of religiosity in secular Turkey of Ataturk, Alevis in search of identity 
became urban and secular (Shankland 2003). This helped them get a democratic identity both in 
their country of origin and in countries where they had immigrated. Sehriban Sahin, in her 
dissertation, says that massacres like the Corum pogrom of 1980, which left more than 50 Alevis 
dead, instilled intense cultural and religious consciousness in Alevis, and they started demanding 
religious neutrality of the state institutions (Sahin 2001). Unlike other Islamic sects, Alevis, who 
self-identify as non-traditional Sunni Muslims, are excluded from the financial support of the state 
(Stepan 2011, 120). Having Ataturk as their ideal, they identify themselves as secular and modern 
(Shankland 2003, 5). Various studies suggest that Alevis are now distinguished from other 
Muslims, not only in Turkey but also in Europe, because of their open acceptance of democratic 
values. Casanova says that the contentious debates in Europe over the potential integration of 
Muslim Turkey into the European Union are overshadowed by the debates on the alleged failure 
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to integrate second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants into European culture (Casanova 
2007, 63). Of course, this notion of non-integration does not apply to Alevis.  
Apart from being welcoming to secular values, there are some other similarities between 
Ahmadis and Alevis which have developed after their spending many decades under oppression. 
Like Ahmadis in Pakistan, Alevis in Turkey are reluctant to talk about their religion (Shankland 
2003, 3). Both groups wish to avoid theological debate that could turn into a religious clash. They 
do not share details of their religion or persecution, or some of them do not disclose their religious 
identity until they believe that the researcher or journalist is not against them. Another similarity 
between the two communities is that they make themselves look different from other Muslims. 
They give particular shapes to their beards to look like their fellows and to distinguish them from 
other Muslims. Generally, Kizilbash to describe Alevis and Qadiani to refer to Ahmadis are 
pejoratives, but they both use these terms with a sense of pride and reaction. These self-labels seem 
to defy the public perception and to be an assertion of their identity. The current rise of Islamism 
in Turkey, like conversion of Hagia Sophia museum into the mosque, construction of a big mosque 
in historic Taqsim square, and increase in the number of Imam Hatip Schools, might add into the 
miseries of Alevis and other religious minorities in Turkey and undermine its claim of being 
secular.  
These communities conceive secularism as a state instrument contrasting state repression 
in the name of the majority’s religion. Particularly in the case of Ahmadis and Ismailis, with the 
increase of the level of persecution and exclusion in the country of origin, secular Canada provided 
them with a sense of acceptance, belonging and protection. The growing level of persecution and 
an increase in their sense of protection brought a gradual increase in their support for secularism. 
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Their belonging to religious persecuted communities significantly affects their supports to 
religious neutrality.  
With these findings, considering all Muslims as fundamentalists, antimodern, and 
incompatible with secularism seems misleading. In studying Muslims’ attitudes towards the 
democratic values of the West, they must not be considered a homogeneous group. Religiosity is 
a multifaceted phenomenon. When studying Muslims’ approaches toward secular values, factor of 
persecution must be kept in view. The study of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan and Canada 
and comparative studies of Alevis and Ismailis, supported by academic scholarship, confirm my 
hypothesis that certain Muslim immigrant groups, based on their belonging to persecuted 
communities in the countries of their origin, support secular values in their countries of origin and 
their host countries. Alongside these findings, several other questions have relevance about 
Muslim persecuted communities in the context of their endorsement of secular values and they 
remain unanswered: Do level and duration of persecution and ethnic background of these 
communities also affect their level of endorsement of secular values? Is being peaceful a condition 
for these heterodox communities’ endorsement of secularism? Does the level of accommodation 
also affect the level of the endorsement? Does their endorsement of secular values as community 
affect their individual religiosity? What does it mean to be an orthodox Muslim investigating the 
approaches of heterodox Muslim communities toward secular values?  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Family tree of Ghulam Ahmad to show four out of five caliphs from his family (Khan 2015, 183).  
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Appendix 2 
Two clippings of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal. It carries statement of second Ahmadiyya caliph 
dated April 10, 1944. The text highlighted with red pen, he says Pakistan cannot come into 
existence. Ahmadis do not need to endorse or negate the idea of formation of Pakistan, he adds.  
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APPENDIX 3  
The Objectives Resolution was unanimously passed by Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly on 
12 March, 1949. It was inserted into the Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 by a Presidential Order 
in 1985. The text of the Objectives Resolution is reproduced below. 
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APPENDIX 4 
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APPENDIX 5  
Screen shot of an anti-Ahmadi discussion taking 
place at a WhatsApp group in June 2019 having 
more than 170 members from Pakistani diaspora at 
GTA. Some Ahmadis are also members of this 
group. It says, “I witness that Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmed Qadiani is a liar and infidel. His follower 
are also infidels and non-Muslims.” 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 
Front page of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal February 15, 1948 
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APPENDIX 7 
Front page of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal January 10, 1948 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
APPENDIX 8 
Picture of daily The Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, October 20, 1950. Published in Jamaat-e-
Ahmadiyya’s Majallah Majlis-e-Ansarullah, Canada, Jan-June 2006.  
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APPENDIX 9 
Front page of monthly Ahmadiyya Gazette Canada, June 1984 
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APPENDIX 10 
News clipping of Calgary Herald, March 09, 1989.  
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